No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/26: LOC-HAK-42-1-20-1

**MEMORANDUM** 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION (Outside System)

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SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

November 29, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY, KISSINGER

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

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SUBJECT:

FROM:

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Progress on Disengagement Talks--Possible Line with Egypt and Israel

suggest that progress

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has been made in the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement talks at Kilometer 101. While there will probably be delays and details to be worked out, you may want to consider messages to Fahmy and through Dinitz which would elaborate on your present position along the following lines.

--We are pleased with reports that the disengagement talks seem to be moving forward, if this is indeed the case. We hope this progress will continue.

--Even if agreement on a first stage of disengagement seems possible, we continue to feel that both parties may want to consider the desirability of announcing the agreement during the first sessions of the peace conference. This could produce a very positive atmosphere for further progress there.

My reason for suggesting this message is that our present position may give the impression that we are trying to delay further talks on disengagement. In fact, I assume our interest is not in delaying sensible negotiation but in timing the actual decision so as to enhance its impact. Originally, of course, we assumed we would be called on to help and could better do so at the conference. We do not want to be in the position of being held responsible for the delay in disengagement talks, but it would obviously be desirable to be able to announce an early agreement at Geneva. The purpose of this approach would be primarily to take your position a step farther to relate to what seems to be the present situation.

NSS, State Dept. reviews completed

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DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

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The positions of the two parties,	25X1
are as follows:	
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--Egypt. The Egyptians envisage a first phase of disengagement in which the Israeli armed forces would pull back to a line approximately 35 km to the east of the Canal. This line should in principle lie to the east of the passes. The Egyptian forces would remain in place east of the Canal but would be thinned out. The Egyptians are also thinking of stationing UNEF between the Egyptian and Israeli forces. This first phase of withdrawal should be followed at an early date by another major Israeli pullback.

--Israel. Israel reportedly will accept the idea of pulling its forces back to a line in the vicinity of the passes east of the Canal. On November 26, General Yariv is said to have accepted a pullback of Israeli forces east of the passes in return for a reduction of the armored strength of Egyptian forces on the east bank. It is not clear that the official Israeli position has evolved quite this far, and there are some indications that Yariv has been getting ahead of his instructions, which has led to Egyptian charges of Israeli stalling. Nonetheless, the Israeli position seems to accept the idea of a substantial pullback of Israeli forces provided that Egyptian armor is thinned out east of the Canal.

## The main sticking points now seem to be the following:

-- Egypt wants any thinning out of forces to be on a "comparable" basis.

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- -- Egypt would like a clear understanding of when the second stage of disengagement should begin.
- --Israel wants to reduce the Egyptian force on the east bank to a token presence.

Despite these difficulties, one cannot preclude the possibility of an agreement being reached in the near future.

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RECOMMENDATION: That you convey the following points to the Egyptians and Israelis:

- --We are encouraged by reports of progress in the current disengagement talks, if indeed they are true. We hope this will continue.
- --We continue to feel that both sides should consider the advantages of being able to announce agreement on disengagement at an early session of the peace conference.

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